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This study examined how social reality restricts children’s tendency for in-group favoritism in group
evaluations. Children were faced with social reality considerations and with group identity concerns.
Using short stories, in this experimental study, conducted among 3 age groups (6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds),
the authors examined the trait attribution effects of reality constraints on eye-color differences and
national group differences. The results show that the trait attributions of all age groups were restricted
by the acceptance of socially defined reality. In addition, when the information about reality was not
considered accurate, only the youngest children showed positive in-group favoritism. It is argued that
these findings are useful in trying to reconcile some of the divergent and contrasting findings in the
developmental literature on children’s intergroup perceptions and evaluations.
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Teacher: The blue-eyed people are the better people in this room.
Pupil: Oh no.
Teacher: Oh yes they are. Blue-eyed people are smarter than brown-
eyed people.
Pupil: Oh no.
Teacher: One day you came to school and told us your dad kicked
you.
Pupil: He did.
Teacher: Do you think a blue-eyed father would kick his son? My
dad had blue eyes; he never kicked me. Greg’s dad has
blue eyes; he never kicked him. What color eyes did
George Washington have?
Class: Blue.
Teacher: Blue, yes. This is a fact that blue-eyed people are better
than brown-eyed people.
This extract is from the documentary The Eye of the Storm
(Center for the Humanities, 1970) in which it is shown how Jane
Elliot, a primary school teacher in Iowa, carried out her famous
classroom intervention. All of her students were White, and to
teach them something about race and racism, she divided the class
into two groups, brown-eyed and blue-eyed students. This process
of categorization changed the situation from one in which there
were individual pupils to one in which there were two “racial”
groups. Elliot proceeded to treat the one group as if they were
inferior, and the next day she subjected the other group to the same
treatment. Having blue or brown eyes was no longer an insignif-
icant feature but became consequential and meaningful. Elliot’s
classroom intervention is typically seen as a powerful example of
the intergroup nature of stereotypes and prejudice. It vividly illus-
trates what happens when children’s self-understandings are de-
rived from the social groups to which they belong.
As shown in the extract, the distinction was not readily
accepted by the students. Elliot had to do quite some discursive
work to make it plausible and justified. She turned the distinc-
tion into realities by stressing their factual nature (“This is a
fact”) and by giving concrete examples that would prove that
blue-eyed (or brown-eyed) people are smarter, nicer, or simply
better. After defining it as real, she associated the two groups
with different rights and privileges. She argued that because the
blue-eyed people are the better people, they, for example,
should sit at the best places in the front of the class, go first in
line, be allowed to use a paper cup to drink from the water
fountain, get extra minutes at recess, and be allowed to go for
seconds in the cafeteria.
In the class and in the playground, the children started to use the
labels among themselves for self-definition and for describing and
treating others. They started to act in agreement with the way the
categories were defined and began to understand and to live their
lives accordingly. When an individual is one of the better people
and being better means having more rights and privileges, then it
is logical to behave in such a way. In other words, one could argue
that within the logic of the situation as defined, the children’s
behavior was rational, reality oriented, and not stereotypical or
prejudiced, although the children also started to use the labels in
name calling. It is only because people know that blue- and
brown-eyed children actually do not differ in capacities and traits
that they see this as an example of stereotyping and prejudice. We
expect that it is when people ignore socially defined reality and
make an unfounded intergroup distinction in favor of their own
group that social identity processes are involved.
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901Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) is increas-
ingly being used as an important framework for understanding
group evaluations among children (see Bennett & Sani, 2004). The
theory accounts for the development of intergroup relations in
terms of processes of self-categorization and group identity, and it
has been found to explain gender, ethnic, racial, national, and other
group distinctions (e.g., Bennett, Lyons, Sani, & Barrett, 1998;
Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Nesdale, 2004; Reiza ´bal, Valen-
cia, & Barrett, 2004; Rutland, 1999; Spielman, 2000; Verkuyten &
Thijs, 2001; Yee & Brown, 1992). A key assumption of the theory
is that people are motivated to evaluate their own group positively,
thereby enhancing or maintaining a positive sense of their social
self. According to SIT, establishing favorable distinctiveness of
one’s group vis-a `-vis other groups, or in-group favoritism, helps to
achieve a positive group identity. In-group favoritism is regarded
as a primary strategy for securing positive identity, and research
among children has shown that such favoritism does indeed pos-
itively and causally affect self-feelings (e.g., Verkuyten, 2001,
2007). However, for SIT, in-group favoritism is by no means an
automatic product of group distinctions (see Reicher, 2004). The
theory stresses that psychological processes should be examined in
social context. The cognitive process of social categorization and
the striving for a positive identity can explain why people show,
for example, in-group favoritism but do not explain when people
show such favoritism and how people make positive group dis-
tinctions (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004). In-group favoritism is a
function, for example, of normative beliefs about group differ-
ences, perceived group threats, and the actual status positions of
the groups concerned (McGarty, 2001; Nesdale, 2004; Turner,
1999). Tajfel (1979) argued that these forms of social reality
should be taken into account when examining group behavior, and
self-categorization theory (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994) states
that the preference for positive social identities is constrained by
the reality principle (Spears, 2002). Trait attributions or stereotype
content, for example, are considered and found to be sensitive to
the realities of group life. Stereotypes are seen as tools that are
used to represent group members’ shared social reality (Haslam,
Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, & Doosje, 2002). Thus, there is not only
the need for a positive identity but also the need to stay in touch
with socially defined reality.
Social Reality Constraints
Children are curious about the elements that constitute the world
that they try to make sense of. They are strongly motivated to seek
appropriate evidence and arguments for understanding the social
world. The mechanism of epistemic motivation implies a drive to
understand and master events in the world and thus to create
knowledge (Fischer & Connell, 2003; Van Geert, 1998). Epistemic
motivation is central in a Piagetian framework in which, for
example, the process of accommodation indicates the modification
of existing knowledge structures in order to deal with new discov-
eries (Piaget, 1972). Children also have been found to strive to
interpret or make sense of social rules, regulations, and practices
(Corsaro & Eder, 1990). Furthermore, the research literature on
children’s societal cognition has argued and shown that acquiring
an adequate understanding of social reality, including social
groups (Hirschfeld, 1996), is a crucial aspect of the process of
growing up (see Barrett & Buchanan-Barrow, 2005, for an over-
view). Such an understanding is important for being able to func-
tion appropriately within various situations and contexts. This
means that it can be expected that the desire to view one’s in-group
in a positive way, as proposed by SIT, is restricted by epistemic
motivation and social reality (Fischer & Connell, 2003).
By using the term social reality, we are not arguing for infor-
mation about social groups that is necessarily valid or accurate.
The emphasis is on social constructions and shared interpretations
for which concepts such as socially shared knowledge (Thompson
& Fine, 1999) and interobjectivity have been used (Moghaddam,
2003). According to the social identity perspective, this knowledge
is inherently linked to group memberships and self-
categorizations. Groups develop shared understandings of the so-
cial world, and epistemic authorities play a major role in this
development (Bar-Tal, 2004; Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Brosh,
1991). Children arrive at objectifications of the social world based
on the informational and normative system provided by these
authorities, such as parents and teachers. Epistemic authorities,
like Elliot, exert a determinative influence on the formation of a
child’s knowledge and beliefs about social groups.
Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Roefs, and Simons (1997) showed that
group ratings are indeed constrained by consensual definitions of
social reality. Members of two students associations were found to
display in-group favoritism but without violating the social defi-
nitions about which traits were typical for each group. Other
studies have found similar results (Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001;
Spears & Manstead, 1989). People appear to take socially defined
reality into account while giving group ratings. Social identity
processes are constrained by social reality, especially for subordi-
nate groups. Similar to the Elliot example, for high-status groups,
expressed superiority or in-group favoritism on consensually de-
fined status-related dimensions can be taken to reflect social real-
ity. In contrast, defining positive group distinctions on these status-
related dimensions is more difficult for subordinate groups. People
who belong to such a group are motivated to differentiate their
group in a positive sense from other groups, but the fact of their
lower status prevents them from claiming a positive identity on
these status dimensions. Hence, it can be argued that subordinate
group members will display in-group favoritism but without vio-
lating socially defined reality. It is only when specific trait dimen-
sions are not clearly or consensually associated with an out-group
that there is room for in-group favoritism on these dimensions.
Empirical Evidence
To our knowledge, no studies have explicitly and systematically
examined how social reality affects in-group favoritism among
children. Studies have either focused on social identity processes
or have examined cognitive development in terms of children’s
increased ability to make adequate sense of social reality. For
example, sociocognitive theory (Aboud, 1988) suggests that the
developmental trajectory of prejudice depends on cognitive devel-
opment. The idea is that some group judgments reflect actual
existing differences better than others and that, with age, cognitive
processes and structures become more adapted to reality. Hence, a
developmental sequence of reduced prejudice is proposed. There is
some supporting evidence for this theory (e.g., Doyle & Aboud,
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2001, for a review), but there are also some problematic research
findings. For example, some studies indicate a renewed elevation
in prejudice during early adolescence, which is not in line with the
linear prediction of the theory (e.g., Black-Gutman & Hickson,
1996; Reiza ´bal et al., 2004; Rutland, 1999; Teichman, 2001).
Furthermore, the theory does not provide adequate explanations
for understanding intergroup evaluations of children from low-
status or subordinate groups. Bigler, Brown, and Markell (2001),
for example, found that children of self-perceived high-status
groups developed in-group favoring attitudes, whereas low-status
group children did not. In addition, Nesdale and Flesser (2001)
found that children as young as 5 years of age are sensitive to
group status differences that have an impact on their group atti-
tudes. Although expressing liking for their in-group, children in a
low-status group were less positive about their in-group and
wished to change groups more often than did children in the
high-status group. Furthermore, ethnic and racial minority group
children have been found to assign more negative than positive
traits to in-group representative figures than out-group figures
(e.g., Cramer & Anderson, 2003; Davey, 1983; Williams, Best, &
Boswell, 1975). However, other studies did not find an effect for
comparative status on group attitudes (e.g., Nesdale, Durkin,
Maass, & Griffiths, 2004; Yee & Brown, 1992, 1994), and various
studies have found in-group favoritism among ethnic minority
group children (e.g., Verkuyten, 2002; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2001).
One probable reason for these varied results is the role of
socially defined reality. Reality constrains minority group children
in making favorable in-group comparisons on dimensions that are
seen as more typical for the dominant out-group. In their research,
Yee and Brown (1992) manipulated group status by giving pre-
school and elementary school-age children bogus scores for an
egg-and-spoon race that ostensibly placed them either in a fast or
a slow team. The children were also told that members of the high-
and low-status (i.e., fast and slow) groups were selected for mem-
bership in a particular group on the basis of their performance in
the race. Group status was found not to affect in-group and
out-group affective ratings because both groups showed in-group
favoritism. Status did have a moderating effect, however, on the
performance ratings. The in-group team was rated as faster than
the other team by children placed on the fast team, whereas
children placed on the slow team rated their in-group team as
slower than the other team. Thus, the performance ratings were in
accord with the actual comparison information given. Hence, these
performance ratings reflected reality rather than social identity
concerns that, probably, guided the affective ratings.
Social Identity and Social Reality Constraints
The central aim of the present research conducted in the Neth-
erlands was to try to make a more systematic case for the impor-
tance of considering reality for understanding children’s inter-
group trait attributions. Thus, the focus was on the differential
attribution of traits to the in-group compared with the out-group.
The central idea tested is that in-group favoritism among children
of subordinate groups is dependent on their understanding of social
reality as defined by epistemic authorities. This idea was examined
among three age groups (6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds) and by using
short stories in which, first, Elliot’s distinction between blue and
brown eyes was used and, second, national group differences were
manipulated experimentally.
When one examines social reality constraints, it is important to
be able to control for the stereotypicality of the dimensions that are
used to give group ratings. Only then is it possible to reliably
separate social reality constraints from biased judgments. This
means that the way the social reality of the group distinction is
defined should be manipulated or assessed independently. We used
two approaches for doing so. First, in the story about eye color, we
were able to consider children whose identity is not linked to
membership in either the blue-eyed or the brown-eyed group.
Children with green or gray eyes do not belong to these groups (the
nonmembers) and therefore have no vested identity interest in one
group or the other. Hence, their ratings most likely reflect the real
perceived differences between the two groups (see Ellemers et al.,
1997). These nonmembers’ ratings can be compared with those of
children who are members of one or the other eye-color group—
and the low-status group in particular—and who will have a desire
to make a favorable in-group distinction.
The assumption behind this first approach is that the nonmem-
bers’ ratings reflect reality. Although plausible, this assumption
implies an indirect test of reality constraints because reality is not
measured or manipulated experimentally. Therefore, we, secondly,
used a more direct test in the three stories about national group
differences. We experimentally used two frames that refer to the
distinction between fact and opinion. Thus, national group char-
acteristics were presented in either a social reality account or as a
more personal belief. In the stories, children were presented with
situations in which a comparison was made between the Dutch
in-group and a national out-group. In the stories, three comparison
out-groups were used: a nonexisting national out-group (Moor-
land) and two existing national groups (Chinese and Americans).
For each out-group, one particular trait dimension was used. This
means that there was a confounding of out-group and dimension.
However, we were not concerned with the rating differences
among these three out-groups but rather with the question of
whether for these groups social reality restricts biased evaluations
in a similar way. In addition, because our study focused on the
relationship between social reality and group identity among sub-
ordinate groups, we tried to place the participants in a subordinate
or low-status position. That means that all comparisons were
unfavorable for the in-group. Inducing a low-status position in
comparison with an unknown, nonexisting out-group might be
difficult, however. That is why we also included two existing
national groups (Chinese and Americans) and used two trait di-
mensions that were considered rather typical for both groups.
Age Differences
In order to examine possible age differences in reality con-
straints, we studied three age groups. Developmental accounts of
group attitudes argue for changes as a function of age. For exam-
ple, sociocognitive theory (Aboud, 1988) assumes an age-related
progression in the ability to perceive and interpret group stimuli
and intergroup behaviors. Changes in group attitudes would cor-
respond to changing cognitive abilities that expand children’s
experiences and focus of attention. In particular, it is argued that,
because of limited cognitive capabilities, affective influences,
emotional attachments, and an egocentric social perspective, pre-
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dislike other groups. When children reach the age of 7–8, cogni-
tive development advances to concrete operational thinking (Pi-
aget, 1972) whereby views of people shift from affective criteria to
more objective and less egocentric ones, leading to a steady
decline in prejudice. In their study, Yee and Brown (1992) found
an age effect for the group performance ratings of the egg-and-
spoon race. In the low-status group, the 5-year-olds did show the
most overall in-group favoritism on these ratings, followed by the
7-year-olds, whereas the 9-year-olds did not favor their in-group.
Hence, the 5-year-olds, but not the 9-year-olds, disregarded the
comparison information provided and evaluated their own team as
faster than the other (fast) team. In studying self-evaluative re-
sponses in an achievement setting, Ruble, Parsons, and Ross
(1976) found a similar age effect. In two studies, they found that
the use of outcome and task ease information about the achieve-
ment task increased with age: 10-year-olds made more use of the
information for making self-evaluations than did 6-year-olds.
The developmental progression in group attitudes can also be
accounted for in other terms (e.g., Ocampo, Knight, & Bernal,
1997). Rather than changes in cognitive development, age-related
increases in knowledge and learning may be responsible for group
attitudes. This is particularly likely for large-scale social groups
with which children have few daily experiences, such as other
nationalities. Awareness and knowledge about these kinds of
groups increases with age (Barrett, Lyons, & Del Valle, 2004;
Ocampo et al., 1997; McKown & Weinstein, 2003). Both lines of
thinking led us to expect that with age, children would be more
strongly influenced or restricted by “reality” in making intergroup
differentiations.
To summarize, we examined children’s group evaluations when
the intergroup comparison is with their in-group disadvantage. We
expected that socially defined reality would restrict the children’s
tendency to show in-group favoritism. Hence, under the condition
of reality constraints, brown-eyed children (low status in the eye-
color story) and participants in general (low status in the national
comparisons) were not expected to show in-group favoritism,
whereas in-group favoritism was expected when there was no such
constraint. In addition, with age, children were expected to more
strongly take account of the socially defined or evidence-based
(lack of) differences between groups. This means that we expected
social identity concerns to be more influential among 6-year-old
than among 10-year-old children. Thus, the former age group was
expected to show in-group favoritism, whereas the latter group
was not.
Most studies on intergroup relations use difference scores to
examine in-group favoritism or the evaluation of the in-group
relative to the out-group. Difference scores have the dual advan-
tage of corresponding to the theoretical idea of positive intergroup
differentiation and that they take some response biases into ac-
count. For example, children may have a tendency to give positive
responses so that in-group positive evaluations correlate strongly
with out-group positive evaluations. Furthermore, difference
scores are adequate when people do not evaluate groups indepen-
dently but are explicitly asked to make an intergroup comparison,
as in the present study. Hence, we examined in-group favoritism or
difference scores. However, various authors have pointed out and
found that there are different processes determining the in-group
and out-group aspects of group differentiation among children
(e.g., Aboud, 2003; Bennett et al., 2004; Brewer, 1999; Cameron,
Alvarez, Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001). In-group oriented patterns of
preference do not have to be accompanied by rejection of other
groups. Because of this, we also examined in- and out-group trait
attributions separately.
Method
Sample
In total, 337 ethnically Dutch children participated in the study
(52% were girls and 48% were boys). There were 119 children
from Grade Level 3 whose mean age was 6.37 (SD  0.53), 105
children from Grade Level 5 (mean age  8.40, SD  0.58), and
113 children from Grade Level 7 (mean age  10.47, SD  0.56).
The participants were drawn from primary schools in the cities of
Utrecht and Rotterdam.
Design
For measuring trait attributions, we used short stories. Similar to
the Elliot example, the stories involved an adult person (the epi-
stemic authority) making group assessments of, first, blue-eyed
and brown-eyed children and, subsequently, of three national
out-groups in comparison with the Dutch. These two types of tasks
were used in order to examine social reality in two ways: (a) first,
by using the ratings of children (green or gray eyes) who do not
belong to any of the two eye-color groups involved in the com-
parison and (b) second, by using the distinction between a social
reality account and a personal belief. The first task offers an
indirect test of reality constraints and the second one offers a more
direct test. The combination of both tasks allowed us to examine
whether reality constraints are found across different tasks and
different intergroup contexts.
The participants were presented first with a story about eye-
color differences that read as follows:
The other day on television in The News for Children there was a
famous professor who was talking about teasing. He said, “I have
done a lot of research on teasing and I have discovered that children
who have blue eyes tease other children much less than children who
have brown eyes. People with blue eyes are much nicer than people
with brown eyes and that’s why they tease less.”
The aim of this story was to place the brown-eyed participants
in a subordinate status position.
For measuring national stereotypes, we used three stories. Be-
cause we were interested in the ways that low-status groups
coordinate identity concerns with social reality, we presented the
three national out-groups as relatively more positive than the
Dutch. This was done by using the traits “hard working” in relation
to Moorlanders, “warm and friendly” in relation to Chinese, and
“smart” in relation to Americans. The choice of the traits for the
latter two nationalities was based on informal discussions with
children about typical traits of different nationalities. Being warm
and friendly was considered relatively typical of Chinese people,
and being smart was considered typical of Americans (see also
Cullingford, 2000). A between-subjects design was used in which
half of the children of each age group were presented with stories
in which epistemic authorities emphasized the factual nature of the
national differences. The other half of the children were presented
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being a personal opinion. In doing so, the distinction between
knowing and thinking was used, and children have been found to
be sensitive to the epistemic implications of these mental verbs
(see Wellman, 1990). In presenting these stories, we used a fully
randomized design in which both the order of the three stories
presented was randomized as well as the factual nature of the
stories. The two stories about Moorlanders are as follows, with the
alternate ending shown in brackets:
Have you ever heard of Moorland? Do you know where it is? It is a
country far away from here at the other side of the world, close to
Australia. The Moorlanders live there. One day, at another school, a
man came to tell the children something about Moorland. He knows
a lot about it because he has lived there for many, many years. He says
that Moorlanders are more hard-working people than the Dutch. [He
has never been in Moorland but has heard about it. He says that he is
not sure, but he thinks that Moorlanders are more hard working people
than the Dutch].
The stories about the Chinese read as follows, with the alternate
ending shown in brackets:
Yesterday in the newspaper there was a story about a woman who for
many years has studied Chinese at the University. She has learned
very much about the Chinese and knows them well. She says that
Chinese people are really much warmer and friendlier than Dutch
people [. . . who likes China but does not know much about them. She
says that she thinks that Chinese people are much warmer and friend-
lier than Dutch people].
And the following two stories were used for the Americans, with
the alternate ending shown in brackets:
Last week there was a TV program about America and all the
beautiful things that they make there. In the program, there was an
older teacher who has worked in Dutch schools but also in many
American schools. She says that she knows why Americans make so
many beautiful things: It is because they are much smarter than the
Dutch. [In the program, there was an older teacher who has only
worked at Dutch schools and never been to America. She says that she
is not sure, but she thinks that Americans make so many beautiful
things because they are much smarter than the Dutch.]
Procedure and Measures
The children were seen individually in 20-min sessions by two
trained researchers, one of whom was Angela De Wolf. Interviews
took place in quiet rooms set aside for the purpose of conducting
the research.
After the eye-color story, the children were asked three ques-
tions. The first question was on eye-color self-categorization, and
the children were asked to indicate what their own eye color was.
Their self-labeling was checked by the experimenter and there
were very few miscategorizations. Subsequently they were asked
two questions on group stereotypes: “How many children with
blue eyes are nice and friendly?” and “How many children with
brown eyes are nice and friendly?” For these two questions and to
visualize the response categories, children were presented with
four cards with rectangles of increasing size (see Kinket &
Verkuyten, 1999; Van den Bergh & De Rycke, 2003). The smallest
card represented very few (1) and the largest card represented
many (4).
For each story on the national group differences, the children
were asked three questions using 4-point scales. The questions
were on out-group stereotypes (e.g., “How many Chinese are nice
and friendly?”), in-group stereotypes (e.g., “How many Dutch are
nice and friendly?”), and their own assessment of the truth of the
statement made by the person in the story (e.g., “Do you think that
it is really true what that woman says that Chinese are nicer and
friendlier than the Dutch?”). For the first two questions, children
were presented with the same four cards with rectangles of in-
creasing size as response categories. For the third question, similar
cards were used but this time the response categories ranged from
1( not true)t o4( true).
In order to make sure that the children understood the task and
were familiar with the response cards, we asked two preliminary
questions. The children were asked whether they liked dogs and
whether they thought that purple was a nice color. They responded
by choosing the appropriate response card.
Results
Blue Eyes and Brown Eyes
On the self-categorization question, 144 children (43%) said that
they had blue eyes, 128 children (37%) indicated that they had
brown eyes, and 65 children (19%) had another eye color (green,
gray).
The eye-color story had a clear intergroup character, and the
children were explicitly asked to make a comparison between
blue-eyed and brown-eyed peers. Thus, we examined the level of
intergroup differentiation by subtracting the out-group eye-color
score from the in-group eye-color score. Hence, a higher score
indicates a more positive differentiation in favor of the own
eye-color group. For the other eye-color participants, we sub-
tracted the brown-eyed score from the blue-eyed score.
The intergroup score was subjected to a 3  3 analysis of
variance (ANOVA), with age and self-categorized eye color
(brown, blue, other) as between-subjects variables. This analysis
revealed a significant main effect for self-categorized eye color,
F(2, 337)  27.58, p  .001. A post hoc analysis indicated that all
differences among the three groups were significant (ps  .01). As
shown in the last column in Table 1, the high-status blue-eyed
participants had the most positive score, followed by the low-status
brown-eyed participants and the participants with other eye colors.
The score of the other eye-colored participants did not differ
significantly from zero, t(63)  1.66, p  .10. Hence, despite the
introductory story, these nonmembers who have no vested interest
in one eye-color group or the other did not see being nice and
friendly as more typical for either brown- or blue-eyed peers. This
social reality of no actual differences can be expected to restrict the
desire to view oneself in a positive way. Thus, children who are
members of the two eye-color groups under investigation should
not hold more biased judgments favoring the in-group. However,
positive in-group favoritism was found. The blue-eyed participants
did evaluate blue-eyed peers more positively than brown-eyed
peers, and their score differed significantly from zero indicating
in-group favoritism, t(144)  7.16, p  .001. Similarly, the
low-status brown-eyed participants also showed in-group favorit-
ism, t(127)  3.66, p  .001.
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categorization was qualified by a significant interaction effect with
age, F(4, 237)  14.07, p  .001. Separate analysis revealed a
significant effect for the 6-year-olds, F(2, 118)  31.32, p  .001,
no significant effect for the 8-year-olds, F(2, 103)  2.56, p  .08,
and no significant effect for the 10-year-olds, F(2, 107)  1.86,
p  .10. For the youngest age group, the score for the other
eye-colored participants did not differ significantly from zero,
t(18)  1.41, p  .10. However, for the low-status brown-eyed
participants, as expected, in-group favoritism was found among
the 6-year-olds, t(43)  4.60, p  .001, but not among the two
older age groups. Thus, the reality of nonexisting differences
between blue-eyed and brown-eyed peers restricted the older low-
status participants (brown-eyed) from making a positive in-group
differentiation but not the 6-year-olds.
For the high-status blue-eyed participants, significant in-group
favoritism was found for the 6-year-olds, t(57)  7.11, p  .001,
and for the 8-year-olds, t(53)  3.33, p  .01, but not for the
10-year-olds.
In addition to intergroup differentiation, the evaluations of the
blue-eyed target group and the brown-eyed target group were
analyzed separately. For the evaluation of the high-status blue-
eyed group, significant main effects for age and for self-
categorized eye color were found (ps  .001). These effects were
qualified, however, by a significant interaction effect between
these two factors, F(4, 337)  6.24, p  .001. For the two oldest
age groups, no differences for self-categorization were found. For
the 6-year-olds, however, the evaluation of blue-eyed peers was
significantly more positive among the blue-eyed participants (M 
3.64, SD  0.58) than among the brown-eyed participants (M 
2.66, SD  0.84). Post hoc tests indicated that the score for the
other eye-colored participants was in between (M  3.21, SD 
0.98) and did not differ significantly from the other two.
There was also a significant interaction effect for the evalu-
ation of the low-status brown-eyed peers, F(4, 337)  2.70, p 
.001. Again, there was only a difference for the youngest age
group. For this age group, post hoc analysis revealed that the
brown-eyed participants (M  3.41, SD  0.76) had a signif-
icantly more positive score than did the blue-eyed participants
(M  2.60, SD  0.91) and the other eye-colored participants
(M  2.79, SD  0.98). These results suggest that compared
with the two older age groups, the evaluations of the 6-year-
olds were more strongly driven by social identity than by social
reality concerns.
National Group Comparisons
Truth assessment. In a first set of analyses, we examined
whether the experimental manipulations (facts vs. opinions) had
effects on children’s own estimation of how really true the claims
in the stories were. ANOVAs, with experimental manipulation and
age as variables, revealed that the experimental condition had
significant effects for all three stories. There were no effects for
age or for the interaction between experimental manipulation
and age.
For the Moorland comparison, the children were more con-
vinced of the stories in the experimental factual condition (M 
2.2, SD  0.95) than in the opinion condition (M  1.8, SD 
0.90), F(1, 345)  4.22, p  .05. For the Chinese comparison, a
similar difference was found, F(1, 333)  7.81, p  .01. The truth
score was higher in the factual condition (M  2.1, SD  0.79)
than in the opinion condition (M  1.6, SD  0.92). For the
American comparison, the difference was also significant F(1,
333)  4.55, p  .05. Again, the children were more convinced of
the stories in the factual condition (M  1.89, SD  0.88) than in
the opinion condition (M  1.59, SD  0.87).
Thus, the children were more convinced of the stories in the
factual condition than in the opinion condition. The mean scores,
however, were low and around “a bit true” indicating that most
children were skeptical. Furthermore, preliminary analyses
showed no significant effects of the experimental condition on the
various intergroup differentiations. However, because the experi-
mental manipulation did have effects on the children’s truth as-
sessment, we did additional analyses with this variable for which
a distinction between not true versus somewhat true was made.
Moorland comparison. The stories had a clear intergroup
character, and the children were explicitly asked to make group
comparisons. Thus, we examined the level of intergroup differen-
tiation by subtracting the out-group (Moorland) score from the
in-group (Dutch) score. Hence, a higher score indicates a more
positive in-group differentiation. An ANOVA, with age and truth
assessment as variables, revealed no significant interaction effect.
However, there was a clear significant main effect for the latter
variable, F(1, 331)  36.37, p  .001. As shown in Table 2, the
children who did not consider the assessment in the story to be true
showed positive in-group differentiation, t(133)  4.32, p  .01.
In contrast, negative in-group differentiation was found for the
children who rated the statement as true, t(198)  4.40, p  .001.
Hence, when there were no reality constraints, participants showed
Table 1
Positive In-Group Favoritism Scores for Three Age Groups
Eye-color self-
categorization
Six-year-olds
(N  119)
Eight-year-olds
(N  105)
Ten-year-olds
(N  113) Total
MnMnMnM n
High-status blue 1.03 56 0.31 53 0.09 35 0.55 144
Low-status brown 0.75 44 0.03 40 0.09 44 0.28 128
Other 0.42 19 0.01 12 0.09 34 0.17 65
Note. For the other group, we computed the score by subtracting the brown-eyed score from the blue-eyed score.
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defined reality, they showed out-group favoritism.
This result for intergroup differentiation can be due to an effect
on the in-group or the out-group score or on both. Additional
ANOVAs, with the in-group and out-group evaluations as separate
dependent variables, revealed that the truth assessment had a
significant effect on both in-group evaluation, F(1, 333)  8.38,
p  .001, and on out-group evaluation, F(1, 333)  18.75, p 
.001. The children who rated the assessment as true had a more
positive out-group score and a more negative in-group score than
did the children who did not consider the assessment in the story
very likely.
For intergroup differentiation, the ANOVA also revealed a main
effect for age, F(2, 331)  3.85, p  .05. Simple main effects
analysis showed a linear age trend whereby the 6-year-olds
showed the highest level of positive intergroup differentiation,
followed by the 8-year-olds and then the 10-year-olds, who
showed out-group favoritism (see Table 2). A post hoc analysis
indicated that the difference between the latter age group and the
two others was significant. The scores of the 6- and 8-year-olds did
not differ significantly. Separate analyses for in-group and out-
group scores indicated that there was a significant age effect for
in-group evaluation only, F(2, 333)  14.74, p  .001. The
6-year-olds had a more positive score (M  3.25, SD  0.75)
compared with the 8-year-olds (M  2.91, SD  0.72) and the
10-year-olds (M  2.73, SD  0.61).
Chinese comparison. For intergroup differentiation (Dutch–
Chinese), a significant effect for truth assessment was found, F(1,
331)  25.60, p  .001. The result is shown in the last column in
Table 2. There was positive in-group differentiation for the chil-
dren who considered the claim in the story not to be true, t(159) 
9.19, p  .001. For the other children, the intergroup differentia-
tion score did not differ significantly from zero, t(174)  1.32, p 
.10. Hence, positive in-group favoritism was found when no reality
constraints were accepted. There was also a main effect for age,
F(2, 331)  9.33, p  .001. The youngest children showed more
in-group favoritism than did the 8-year-olds, and the oldest age
group had the lowest score (see Table 2).
However, these main effects were qualified by an expected
significant interaction effect between age and truth assessment,
F(2, 231)  8.79, p  .001. Separate analysis showed a significant
effect for truth for the 6-year-olds, t(118)  5.44, p  .001, and a
nonsignificant effect for the 8-year-olds, t(103)  1.95, p  .053.
The effect for the 10-year-olds was not significant. Hence, only
among the two youngest age groups was the in-group favoritism
stronger in the not-true compared with the somewhat-true condi-
tion.
A separate ANOVA for in-group and out-group evaluation
revealed for the former score a main effect for age, F(2, 333) 
20.25, p  .001. The 6-year-olds had a more positive in-group
score (M  3.26, SD  0.83) than did the other two age groups
that did not differ significantly (8-year-olds: M  2.81, SD  0.79;
10-year-olds: M  2.64, SD  0.68).
For out-group evaluation, there was a significant effect for truth,
F(1, 331)  30.43, p  .001, that, however, was qualified by an
interaction effect with age, F(2, 331)  7.58, p  .001. For the
6-year-olds, the truth assessment made a difference for their eval-
uation of the out-group, t(118)  3.53, p  .001. For the 8-year-
olds, the difference was not significant, t(103)  1.72, p  .08,
and for the 10-year-olds, there was not a significant difference.
United States comparison. Intergroup (Dutch–Americans) dif-
ferentiation was examined as a dependent variable in an ANOVA,
with age and truth assessment as between-subjects variables. As
shown in Table 2 (last column), there again was a main effect for
truth assessment, F(1, 331)  28.15, p  .001. Those who doubted
the reality as defined in the story showed positive in-group differ-
entiation, t(158)  7.88, p  .001, whereas those who rated the
story as somewhat true did not make an evaluative distinction
between both national groups. There was also a main effect for
age, F(2, 333)  8.64, p  .001. The youngest children showed
more in-group favoritism than did the 8-year-olds and the 10-year-
olds (see Table 2).
Table 2
In-Group Favoritism Scores (Dutch Minus Other) for Three Age Groups and Children’s Truth Assessment (Not True vs. Somewhat
True)
Comparison out-group
6-year-olds
(N  119)
8-year-olds
(N  105)
10-year-olds
(N  113) Total
MnMnMnM n
Moorland “more hard working”
Not true 0.60 66 0.46 63 0.19 75 0.44
x 204
Somewhat true 0.09 53 0.31 42 0.45 38 0.29
y 133
Total 0.18
a 0.07
a 0.25
b
Chinese “more warm and friendly”
Not true 1.37 56 0.63 56 0.23 63 0.82
x 175
Somewhat true 0.14 63 0.27 49 0.08 50 0.16
y 162
Total 0.79
a 0.44
b 0.14
c
Americans “smarter”
Not true 1.08 51 0.40 53 0.17 60 0.58
x 164
Somewhat true 0.01 68 0.20 52 0.01 53 0.06
y 173
Total 0.60
a 0.29
b 0.08
b
Note. Positive scores reflect in-group favoritism, and negative scores reflect out-group favoritism. Row and column total scores with different superscripts
represent significant differences.
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effect between truth assessment and age, F(2, 333)  10.44, p 
.001. Separate analysis showed a significant effect for truth for the
6-year-olds, t(125)  5.45, p  .001, but there were no significant
effects for the other two age groups. Hence, only among the
youngest age group was relatively strong in-group favoritism
found in the not-true condition.
For out-group evaluation, an ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect for truth assessment, F(1, 333)  39.11, p  .001, that
was qualified, however, by an interaction effect with age, F(2,
333)  6.91, p  .001. Six-year-olds and 8-year-olds were more
positive about Americans when they accepted that the story was
somewhat true, whereas the difference was not significant (p 
.08) for the 10-year-olds.
For in-group evaluation, there was only a significant age effect,
F(2, 333)  18.09. The youngest age group was significantly more
positive about the Dutch (M  3.33, SD  0.68) compared with
the other two age groups (8-year-olds: M  2.89, SD  0.75;
10-year-olds: M  2.83, SD  0.61).
Discussion
In order to examine whether information about social reality
restricts subordinate children’s tendency for in-group favoritism,
we used the distinction between eye color and manipulated exper-
imentally the nature of national group differences. For the eye-
color story, we included the ratings by nonmembers to assess
whether the children found the claim in the story convincing.
These nonmembers have no vested interest in either group and
therefore no self-serving group identity reasons to favor one or the
other group. Their ratings indicated that despite the story, they did
not make an evaluative distinction between both groups. This
finding suggests that being nice and friendly was not considered
more typical for blue-eyed or brown-eyed peers. In addition, after
answering the questions on the story, the majority of children (all
eye colors) explained to the researchers that they did not believe
the professor’s claim in the story and they referred to their own
everyday experiences to argue that there is no such group differ-
ence. The reality of a nonexisting difference restricts the possibil-
ity for in-group favoritism. It is very difficult to credibly claim
in-group superiority when consensually no empirical basis for an
association between groups and traits is acknowledged to exist.
The results show that the 10-year-olds did indeed show no such
favoritism and that there was only a tendency to do so among the
8-year-old blue-eyed participants. Hence, the two oldest age
groups, and both the blue-eyed and brown-eyed group, did not
show in-group favoritism. However, the 6-year-olds did show a
clear pattern of in-group favoritism. The low-status brown-eyed
participants evaluated the brown-eyed peers more positively, and
the high-status blue-eye participants did the same with the blue-
eyed peers. Hence, whereas the group evaluations of the older
children appeared to be constrained by socially defined reality (the
nonexisting group differences), the responses of the younger chil-
dren seemed to be driven more by the motivation to make favor-
able evaluations of the in-group and thereby of the self (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). These results are similar to research that has found
that in making self-evaluations and intergroup evaluations, 5- and
6-year-olds disregard factual information more easily than do 9-
and 10-year-olds (Ruble et al., 1976; Yee & Brown, 1992).
Our interpretation of these results for the eye-color task rests on
the assumptions that the nonmembers’ ratings reflect reality. This
assumption is plausible but also limited because it implies an
indirect test of reality constraints. Its potential limitation was
addressed in the national group stories in which experimental
prompts were used and children’s own truth assessments were
considered. The manipulation in the short stories was found to
affect the children’s truth assessment of the group distinctions as
presented. All three age groups considered the factual stories as
more true than did those with an expressed opinion. Hence, the
experimental manipulation influenced children’s assessment of the
claim as being true. In turn, this assessment was found to be related
to intergroup differentiation.
Overall, children who did not consider the claim accurate
showed the common and well-established pattern of positive na-
tional in-group differentiation (see Barrett et al., 2004; Bennett et
al., 2004). For them, there was no social reality constraint to
restrict the tendency to differentiate their national in-group posi-
tively from out-groups. However, the children who accepted the
distinction as being somewhat true did not show intergroup dif-
ferentiation or indicated even negative differentiation (out-group
favoritism). This latter result was found in relation to an unknown
out-group (Moorlanders). Additional analyses indicated that chil-
dren’s truth assessment was predominantly related to the out-group
evaluations. The Moorlanders, Chinese, and Americans were eval-
uated more positively when the claim in the story was considered
true. In addition, there was a negative effect on in-group evaluation
but only in comparison with the Moorlanders. This pattern of
findings suggests that children’s group ratings—and their out-
group ratings in particular—are constrained by definitions of so-
cial reality. Children appear to take socially defined reality into
account when giving out-group ratings. They do not display na-
tional in-group favoritism when it is not warranted by reality or
does violate the social definition as to which traits are character-
istic for the out-group. There were, however, clear interactions
with age.
The effect of truth assessment on the evaluation of the Chinese
and Americans was strong for the 6-year-olds, not significant for
the 8-year-olds, and not significant for the 10-year-olds. In all
national comparisons, the 6-year-olds indicated the strongest pos-
itive intergroup differentiation, followed by the 8-year-olds and
then the 10-year-olds. These age differences were not found,
however, when the story claim was accepted as somewhat true. In
that case, reality appeared to constrain all age groups from making
positive in-group distinctions. So, the typical in-group favoritism
reported in many intergroup studies among children (e.g., Bigler et
al., 1997; Nesdale, 2004; Reiza ´bal et al., 2004; Rutland, 1999;
Spielman, 2000; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2001) was not found among
the participants who rated the statement about the in-group’s low
status as true. Children take information about reality into account
while giving group ratings and out-group ratings in particular,
showing that, for all three age groups, social identity processes are
constrained by social reality.
In contrast, there was an age effect for the children who did not
consider the story claim to be true. Hence, when there was more
room for interpretation, the youngest children showed in-group
favoritism, whereas the older children made less or no differenti-
ation between the groups. The result for the youngest children is
consistent with a social identity interpretation in which children
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tively. But this motivation is probably not the only important
variable. Young children’s egocentrism, for example, implies that
they think that their own perspective is correct. In addition, the
result for the older age groups also suggests that cognitive vari-
ables are involved. Sociocognitive theory (Aboud, 1988; Aboud &
Amato, 2001) argues that with age the cognitive ability to perceive
people of large-scale groups in individualized terms increases.
This ability hampers dichotomous thinking and social categorical
evaluations (Aboud, 1988; Aboud & Amato, 2001). Therefore, the
theory predicts a peaking of childhood in-group favoritism and
prejudice around 5–7 years of age and then a decline in subsequent
years. The age effect in the not-true condition is consistent with
this interpretation.
However, it could also be argued that it is not so much quali-
tative changes in thinking that matter but rather other changes.
Older children have more knowledge and more developed personal
beliefs about large-scale collectivities such as ethnic and national
groups (Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2003; Barrett et al., 2004;
Ocampo et al., 1997; McKown & Weinstein, 2003). This interpre-
tation is supported by our finding for the nonexistent Moorlanders
about which the children could not have any knowledge or beliefs.
For all three age groups, the children’s truth assessment had a
similar effect on the evaluation of this group. In addition, the
finding of stronger positive intergroup differentiation for 6-year-
olds compared with older children was due to in-group evaluation.
In contrast, out-group evaluation was not related to age but ap-
peared to be influenced by the perceived reality of the group
distinction. These results are similar to Bennett et al.’s (2004)
multinational study among 6-year-old children. They found that, in
addition to positive in-group evaluation, out-group attitudes were
influenced by the own nation’s particular social representations or
widespread beliefs about the nature of other nationalities.
A third interpretation of the age effect in the not-true condition
is that older children are more able to regulate the expression of
in-group favoring attitudes (Rutland, 2004). With age, children
become sensitive to the norms of adult society, and this change
often implies the unacceptability of stereotyping and prejudice.
However, not all self-serving intergroup evaluations are viewed
negatively in society. In contrast to racial and ethnic prejudices,
national in-group favoritism is often seen as a tolerable or patriotic
form of expression. Hence, social norms surrounding national
group distinctions might actually encourage more in-group favor-
itism among older children, as was found by Rutland (1999). Our
results do not support this interpretation, however, because we
found a decline in national in-group favoritism with age.
To evaluate the present results and to give some suggestions for
further studies, we consider three limitations of our research. First,
the cross-sectional design of the current study implies that we
cannot definitively determine whether the age-related differences
are due to developmental differences in children’s social cognition
or to some other factor such as context effects. However, the
different participating age groups attended the same primary
schools, and the three age groups were examined at each school.
Second, we used only positive traits and no negative traits, there
was no information on knowledge of national stereotypes and
personal beliefs, we examined relatively abstract social categories,
and we focused predominantly on the evaluations by children in a
subordinate intergroup position. Hence, further studies need to
examine the generality of these results by examining, for example,
negative stereotypes, assessing personal beliefs, and using differ-
ent intergroup contexts and different group positions. This should
make it possible to investigate various conditions and variables
that may moderate and/or mediate the effects found. However,
despite these limitations, our study indicates that social reality
considerations can influence out-group trait ratings in middle
childhood, something that has also been found among late adoles-
cents and young adults (Ellemers et al., 1997; Spears et al., 2001;
Spears & Manstead, 1989). For the four stories, the same pattern
of results was found despite the fact that different comparison
contexts were presented and different tasks and traits were used.
Together with findings from other child studies (e.g., Sani &
Bennett, 2001; Sani, Bennett, Mullally, & MacPherson, 2003), and
in agreement with self-categorization theory (Haslam et al., 2002;
Oakes et al., 1994), this finding suggests that group stereotypes can
be cross-situationally variable rather than rigid mental structures.
Future studies could also examine whether social reality consid-
erations do not only influence trait ratings but also, for example,
children’s liking of and preference for their in-group compared
with the out-group. Children may accept that other groups are
superior to their own group on particular attributes but still favor
their in-group (Yee & Brown, 1992).
Third, the experimental manipulations affected children’s truth
assessments, but there was no direct effect on the group evalua-
tions. This finding leaves room for alternative interpretations. It is
possible, for example, that the children rejecting or accepting the
claims in the stories differ in traitlike self-confidence and that
self-confident children are more inclined to rate their in-group
relatively favorably. Although this explanation cannot be ruled
out, the results across the two tasks (eye color and nationalities)
were quite similar. Furthermore, in such a traitlike interpretation,
one would expect rather strong correlations among the truth as-
sessments for the three different nationality stories. The correla-
tions were indeed significant, but the highest one was 0.26, indi-
cating that the questions shared a limited amount of variance
( 7%). Thus, there is some support for this alternative interpre-
tation, but it seems unlikely that it fully accounts for the present
findings.
It could also be argued, however, that children’s truth assess-
ment did not influence their intergroup evaluations but rather the
other way around. Children showing in-group favoritism may have
been more likely to discount the stories as untrue than those with
nonfavoring in-group distinctions. Social identity concerns can
also influence children’s perceptions of reality. However, the re-
sults for the national group comparisons were similar to the eye-
color story in which social reality was also found to restrict
in-group favoritism. In addition, the children were skeptical and
were not very convinced by the group stories. We deliberately did
not use neighboring national out-groups for which there are rela-
tively clear stereotypical beliefs, such as Germans, Brits, and
people from Belgium. The existing stereotypes would make it
difficult to manipulate the distinction between fact and opinion.
However, the finding that the manipulation did not have a direct
effect on the evaluation of a nonexistent and relatively unfamiliar
national groups suggests that the manipulation was insufficiently
clear and strong. In other words, the methodology may well have
prevented a powerful test of the ideas being investigated. Elliot had
to do quite some discursive work to convince her students, whereas
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studies should use other experimental techniques in trying to
disentangle more clearly the influence of social reality and group
identity.
Children are members of various social groups and want to feel
good about their group membership. They can do so by making a
positive distinction in favor of their own group. This is not unre-
stricted, however, because there is also the need to develop an
adequate understanding of social reality. Whereas sociocognitive
development theory can be criticized for its tendency to ignore
intergroup processes, intergroup research has a similar tendency to
ignore children’s developing understanding of social reality. We
suspect that some of the inconsistencies in findings reported in the
literature are due to these tendencies. For example, the result in the
present study and in others that children from subordinate groups
can show out-group favoritism does not have to be contradictory to
a social identity interpretation. This finding can reflect an accurate
assessment of the way that social reality is defined, and such an
assessment is more likely among older children. Younger children
have more immature understandings, which leaves more room for
social identity concerns. This means that the stronger in-group
favoritism and stereotypes often found among 5- to 7-year-old
children is probably not only due to their social cognitions or a
lack of knowledge but also to social motivational considerations
(Nesdale, 2004). It is the lack of a relatively accurate assessment
of social reality that allows the motivation to make favorable
intergroup evaluations to play its part in order to establish a
positive identity.
Furthermore, in-group favoritism and prejudice do not have to
decline with age-related increases in cognitive maturity as socio-
cognitive development theory would predict. One reason is that a
dominant group can think and act in terms of the ways in which
group distinctions are socially defined. This happened in Elliot’s
classroom intervention in which the “superior” children followed
the social reality they found themselves in and started to feel
superior. A second reason is that in many situations there are no
clear, socially agreed on or real group differences. For all age
groups, ambiguous and contested aspects of intergroup situations
offer many possibilities for making evaluations that favor the
in-group over an out-group.
In conclusion, we have tried to argue and show that there is an
important relationship between the need to develop and maintain
an accurate relationship with social reality and the need for posi-
tive social identity. This relationship should be considered in
trying to understand the development of intergroup attitudes
among children and the development of their out-group stereo-
types in particular. We think that such a consideration has prom-
ises in trying to reconcile in future studies some of the divergent
and contrasting findings reported in the literature. It also has
promises for understanding why it often is so difficult to change
children’s attitudes and the important role that epistemic authori-
ties play in fueling or reducing stereotypes and prejudice.
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